

**EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT**  
ROUTING SLIP

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TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI-D		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI	X (Eyes only)			
6	DDA				
7	DDO				
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/OLL				
14	D/PAO				
15	D/PERS				
16	VC/NIC				
17	C/ACIS		X (Eyes only)		
18					
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SUSPENSE \_\_\_\_\_ Date \_\_\_\_\_

Remarks  
To 5: This draft RSVP statement was provided by D/ACDA. Please have C/ACIS share as appropriate and provide DCI any comments.

Executive Secretary

2 Apr 86

Date

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Executive Registry

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~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~PRESIDENTIAL POLICY STATEMENT ON MUTUAL RESTRAINT

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I interim agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations, despite my deep concerns about the serious flaws of SALT II. At that time, the Soviet Union made a similar policy commitment.

While the United States has kept its part of the bargain, unfortunately the Soviets have not. As I have noted in my reports over the last three years to the Congress on Soviet compliance, the Soviet Union has violated and continues to violate the SALT II agreement as well as other agreements, most notably the ABM Treaty. This Administration has raised all these concerns many times and in great detail with the Soviet Union in the Standing Consultative Commission. Our efforts have spanned some 11 sessions of two months each--nearly two years of bilateral discussion--all to no avail. This raises serious questions about Soviet seriousness as to both its international undertakings and arms control itself.

Last June, after reviewing the continuing pattern of Soviet violations, I made clear that the United States could not accept a double standard of US compliance and Soviet non-compliance. I called upon the Soviet Union to take positive concrete steps to live up to its obligations and to reverse its unparalleled military buildup. I said the United States was willing to "go the extra mile" to give Soviet Union time to bring itself into full compliance with its arms control commitments.

Accordingly, I announced that the United States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing strategic arms control agreements, to the extent that the Soviet Union exercised comparable restraint, and provided that the Soviet Union actively pursued arms reduction agreements in the Nuclear and Space Talks in Geneva. I also said that our policy would be under continuing review and reserved the right to take appropriate responses if the Soviets failed to correct their violations.

We've gone the extra mile, without the Soviets' going an inch. They have not stopped violating agreements. Nor have they tempered their strategic buildup or shown the kind of commitment to progress in the Geneva negotiations that we seek.

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-2-

They continue even their most serious and glaring violations:

- o The construction of a large phased-array ballistic missile detection and tracking radar at Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the ABM Treaty;
- o The testing and deployment of the SS-25, a second new type of ICBM--in violation of the SALT II agreement; and,
- o The encryption of telemetry needed to verify compliance with SALT II, in violation of that agreement.

Since the Soviet Union has not responded positively to our restraint, we have no choice but to follow through on our policy of 1982 and 1985. Accordingly, I have decided that the United States will no longer continue its policy commitment not to undercut SALT II, so long as the Soviets continue to violate it. As I have said consistently, our adherence demands Soviet adherence. This is only right, given that we cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance.

As to Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, the SALT I interim agreement and other agreements, we will continue to pursue these vigorously with the Soviet Union and seek their full compliance. Meanwhile, we will continue our commitment not to undercut the expired SALT I interim agreement for the present. US obligations with respect to the ABM Treaty and other accords remain unchanged.

In parallel, we also intend to take such military measures as are necessary to meet US and allied security requirements in light of the Soviet strategic buildup and its arms control violations. Over the coming months I will work closely with the Congress on these measures. We will act prudently, requesting only what is necessary to keep the peace, and attempt to show the Soviets that violations just don't pay. It is absolutely critical that the Congress not diminish our strategic modernization program. Surely the very worst way to respond to Soviet violations would be for the Congress to cut the programs so essential to keep deterrence strong.

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-3-

While we seek progress in Geneva, the United States remains interested in a regime of genuine restraint to replace the flawed SALT II agreement (which did little, if anything, to restrain Soviet strategic force increases). In this regard, I have decided that as a matter of policy:

- o The United States will not exceed 9,000 strategic ballistic missile warheads, our estimate of the current Soviet level, so long as the Soviets do not exceed that level. We will go lower should we find that the Soviets significantly reduce their number of ballistic missile warheads; and,
- o The United States will not exceed 3,000 ALCMs, the current US program level, so long as the Soviets do not increase their ballistic missile warheads or throwweight. Again, we will go lower should we find that the Soviets significantly reduce their ballistic missile warheads and throwweight.

I offer these commitments in the hope that they will lead the Soviet Union to halt and reverse its violations and its military buildup, as well as to provide a framework for genuine restraint and an atmosphere conducive to progress in our Geneva negotiations on deep reductions in nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has been, and continues to be, my highest priority. If the Soviets are willing to take the necessary steps, we can achieve our shared goals of greater stability and a safer world.

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